April 10, 1996
The United Nations is now at a historical juncture to reorient itself to the post cold war era.
In working out ways and means to meet the challenges of the future, the United Nations should not look away from the reality of the Korean peninsula,the only place where the cold war persists undiminished, but settle a proper account with its past associated with the question of Korea.
The question of Korea is, in substance, a matter of Korea's reunification and of ensuring peace there. In recalling five decades of its activities, the UN Yearbook (special edition) recently edited by the UN Secretariat described the "election" staged in south Korea under the UN "supervision" in 1948 and the military actions taken by the United Nations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1950 as the UN's "achievements", which is,indeed, a prejudice lacking impartiality and objectivity.
To help make straight such prejudice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK hereby issues this memorandum.
The UN was abused in dividing Korea.
The Korean nation is the homogeneous nation who has lived with the single language and in the single territory for over 5,000 years. Korea is not a defeated nation in the World War (WW) II.
For the only reason that she was the colony of the Japanese imperialists, Korea was included in the operational zone for the allied forces at the final stage of the WW II. When the United States (US) "persuaded" the then Soviet Union that "the US forces should participate in disarming the Japanese forces stationed in Korea," and thereby divided Korea along the 38th parallel of the north latitude "temporarily," placing the northen part of Korea under the Soviet responsibility and the southern part under US responsibility respectively.
The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and United Kingdom held in December 1945 after the defeat of the Japanese imperialists, adopted a decision to set up "a Korean Democratic Government" and, in order to assist its formation, to "establish a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the US Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea."
Thereafter, however, the United States had insisted on the establishment of provisional legislatures separately in the north and south of Korea before it finally brought the USSR-US Joint Commission to a breakdown, and, in total disregard of the will of the Korean people to set up a unified government by themselves,unilaterally brought the matter to the United Nations which was under its influence at the time.
Led by the US, the UN General Assembly put the "problem of Korean independence" on the agenda at its Second Session in 1947 and adopted Resolution 122 (JI) calling for elections under the supervision of the "UN Temporary Commission on Korea."
Pursuant to this resolution, Lieutenant General John Hodge, the Commanding officer of the US occupation forces, issued on March 1, 1948 a proclamation "that election shall be held within the territory of this command" and forced a separate "election" on May 10 in the area south of the 38th parallel to install a pro-US separatist regime.
It is in contravention of the Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter on the mandate of the General Assembly that the UN General Assembly which was supposed to discuss only the "questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security," discussed the "problem of independence" of a country, or did not "refer to the Security Council for its consideration either before or after discussion" even if it regarded the question of Korea at that time as "relating to the maintenance of international peace and security."
General elections were held in August that year under the true will of the Korean people with the participation of 85.2% of the entire Korean voters (99.97% in the north and 77.52% in the south), which resulted in the founding of the DPRK on September 9,1948. However, the US engineered the adoption of resolution 135 (JII) by the UN General Assembly at its Third Session in December the same year, declaring that the "republic of Korea" had the "jurisdiction" over the area south of the 38th parallel in which the separate election was held. Thus, with the "help" of the UN, the division of Korea was institutionalised, and this was how the history of Korea's tragic national division began.
The UN was abused again for the outbreak of the Korean war.
The forced division of the nation led to the buildup of tension and eventually to the conflict.
The number of different military provocations and armed intrusions into the area north of the 38th parallel began in 1947 increased to as many as 2,617 incidents a year in 1949.
The very paragraph 1, Article 1, Chapter 1 of the Charter for "adjustment of situation which might lead to a breach of the peace" however had never applied to the Korean peninsula, due to the then UN's tendency of following the US and the symptom of the Security Council's functional paralysis, being tied up by the "vetoes" of its permanent members.
But then, on January 13,1950, the representative of the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council,boycotted the Council meeting over the representation of the "republic of China," thus leaving the Soviet "veto power" of the vacuum until the end of July that year it cannot be construed otherwise than a prearranged scenario to have ignited a full-scale war and referred the "situation" to the Security Council at such particular time.
On June 25, the Security Council met on the item "complaint of aggression upon the 'republic of Korea"' brought all of a sudden by the US and "adopted", the same day, Resolution 82 (1950) determining "that the armed attack of north Korean forces upon the 'republic of Korea' constitutes a breach of the peace."
Two days later, on June 27, the Security Council on the same item "adopted" Resolution 83 (1950) recommending the "UN members" to take immediate military steps, and on July 7, ten days later,"adopted" Resolution 84 (1950) making the UN members' forces "available to a unified command under the United States," recommending" the United States to designate the commander of such forces", and authorising "the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag."
Paragraph 3, Article 27 of the Charter provided that the decisions of the Security Council on all matters except procedural ones require "concurring votes" of the permanent members.
The boycott of those Council meetings by the Soviet Union, a permanent member, can by no means be interpreted as a concurring vote. Furthermore, the fact that the Security Council hastily adopted those resolutions one after another in a row without even inviting to its consideration the party against which the "complaint" was lodged, not only constitutes a contravention of the Article 39 of the Council's provisional Rules of procedure but reveals that it was a premeditated action.
The "steps" unjustly taken that way by the then UN under the US strong-arm presure did not help "halt the conflict and restore the peace" but instead brought on the most disastrous all-out war between the US and the DPRK that lasted for the next three years, and thereafter was followed by the world record of a 43 year-long touch-and-go stage of armistice in the absence of any forthcoming assurance for peace.
The silence of the UN Yearbook on this point calls into question the UN's impartiality and objectivity.
The UN is being abused even today, for sustaining the cold war in the Korean peninsula.
Here again, the UN Yearbook (special edition) has failed to refer to the continued existence of the "UN Command" in south Korea.
The "UN Command" is a military mechanism set up by the US in July 1950 pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council Resolution 84 (1950) to command the armed forces sent to the Korean war by the 15 UN members, and the "party" that concluded the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA) on July 27,1953 with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers,the other belligent party.
Existing outside the UN, however, the "UN Command" has become nothing but a bogus instrument that only serves the purpose of camouflaging the real belligent entity.
On January 31,1951, the Security Council adopted Resolution 90 (1951) deciding to "delete from the agenda of the Council," the item "complaint of aggression upon the 'republic of Korea'." The general practice of the Security Council would not allow any deletion of an item from its agenda until the Council's action on the matter have been completed.
The UN does not bear the expenses of the "UN Command",either.
On November 18,1975, the UN General Assembly at its Thirtieth Session adopted Resolution 3390 (XXX) A expressing the hope that the discussions will be completed "in order that the United Nations Command may be dissolved on January 1, 1976 so that by that date no armed forces under the United Nations flag will remain in the south of Korea, "and Resolution 3390 (XXX) B considering it necessary to disolve the United Nations Command and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in south Korea under me flag of the United Nations."
With regard to the authority over the "UN Command", the UN Secretary-General, in his letter of June 24, 1994 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, expressed the views that "no principal organ of the United Nations including the Secretary-General, can be the proper instance to decide on the continued existence or the dissolution of the United Nations Command. By the operative Paragraph 3 of the Resolution 84 (1950), the Security Council did not establish the unified command as a subsidiary organ under its control but merely recommended the creation of such a command, specifying that it be under the authority of the United States. Therefore the dissolution of the unified command does not fall within the responsibility of any United Nations organ but is a matter within the competence of the government of the United States."
The existence of such "UN Command" poses today a legal impediment to the conversion of the current state of armistice into a durable peace to end the cold war in the Korean peninsula. This manifests that the real state parties to the KAA are both the DPRK and the US even if the signatories are the DPRK-PRC and the UN.
The commander of the "UN Command" is designated by the US government while all the successive commanders have exclusuvely been US officers. Traditionally, the commander of the "UN Forces" has concurrently been the commander of the Unified forces of the US and the "ROK" who has the commanding authority over the entire armed forces of south Korea as well as the US forces stationed in south Korea.
And the parties directly involved in the maintenance of the armistice mechanism have been both the DPRK and the US as well.
Since 1958, no UN members other than the US have made any of their armed forces available to the "UN Command", where as the Chinese People's Volunteers has previously completed their withdrawal.
As revealed in the letter of the US government on September 22,1975 to the Security Council, the "UN Command" of that time was already degenerated to a symbolic body with only less than 300 staffs and guards of honour, playing a single role of lending the helmet of the "UN forces" and the UN flag to the commander of the unified forces of the US and the "ROK"
South Korea was neither a UN member at the time nor has it been a party to the KAA. South Korean authorities had been dead set against the ceasefire and its military refused even to sign the KAA. Moreover, the south Korean authorities have yet to take over the commanding authority over their own armed forces from the US who has assumed it since July 1950.
Either from the legal point of view or in terms of the responsibility and competence, it becomes clear after all that the real party to the KAA is the US government, the responsibility of which, however, is being covered up by the signboard of the "UN Command" and the UN flag.
Now, the UN begins getting aware of its unsavory past of having been misused in the question of Korea.
There would have been no such peaceful solution as noted with "satisfaction" by the Security Council, on November 4,1994 but a second war must have broken out had the UN chosen to repeat its past by unilaterally imposing "sanctions" against the DPRK when some antiDPRK elements brought on May 11, 1993 to the Security Council the nuclear issue on which tension was mounting between the DPRK and the US.
The very fact that only the DPRK-US talks produced such a satisfactory solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula clearly shows what choice the UN should make.
In order to help the US to perform its responsibilities and role in ensuring peace in the Korean peninsula, the UN might just as well recommend the dissolution of the "UN Command" as it did "recommend" its establishment to the US back in 1950, or at least retrieve its name and flag from being misused by the US. Doing so would be the right way and a proper deed for the UN that may contribute to peace in the Korean peninsula.
Having put forward recently another proposal for the conclusion of an interim agreement as part of its consistent efforts toward peace on the Korean peninsula,the DPRK is awaiting the US response thereto.